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Abstract
We study experimentally how entry into a market with uncertain capacity is aﬀected
by the type of information potential entrants have available. Our focus is on behavior in
a two-market entry game. In the risky information market there are two possible market
capacities, both known to occur with probability 1/2. In the ambiguous information
market the two possible market capacities eﬀectively occur with probability 1/2 but
participants are only told that there is uncertainty about capacities. We find that
average entry is higher under ambiguous information than under risky information.
To control for comparison eﬀects and the eﬀects of strategic interaction in the two-
market environment we also study a two-lottery individual decision problem and one-
market entry games with ambiguous and risky information. For these two cases the
experimental results show no diﬀerence between information conditions. Our results
are consistent with the notion that complex strategic interaction leads to higher market
entry under ambiguous information.
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1 Introduction
We study experimentally how entry into markets with uncertain capacity is aﬀected by the
type of information potential entrants have available. Our focus is on behavior in an entry
game with two markets. In both markets capacity is uncertain and can take two possible
levels. In one of the markets the information about the uncertain capacity is precise, in the
sense that the probabilities of the two capacity levels are known. In the other market the
information is ambiguous, the probabilities are not known.
Our general motivation is to contribute to the understanding of strategic behavior in
an entrepreneurial context. What we do is related to three lines of research. Two of these
lines are experimental and the third relates to broader issues. The first is the study of
behavior under diﬀerent kinds of uncertainty. Knight (1921) was the first to distinguish
between what he called situations of risk where relevant probabilities are known and what
he called situations of uncertainty, where probabilities are unknown or imperfectly known.
Later Ellsberg (1961) suggested - in a number of thought experiments - that the presence of
imprecise or ambiguous information about probabilities can aﬀect decision making in ways
that lead to inconsistencies with standard models of behavior under uncertainty. Following
the Ellsberg paradox numerous individual decision making experiments were carried out and
new theoretical models of decision-making under uncertainty were developed.
The issue we focus on is a simpler one, namely how people’s behavior varies in a strate-
gic context between situations of risk and situations of ambiguity. There are some other
experimental studies that study ambiguity in various strategic contexts, diﬀerent from the
one we analyze. Sarin and Weber (1993) study ambiguity in an experimental asset market
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using auctions and find that the market price for the unambiguous bet is considerably larger
than the market price of the ambiguous bet. Chen et al. (2006) study ambiguity in the first
and second sealed bid auctions and find that in first price auctions, bids are lower with the
presence of ambiguity, which can be explained as ambiguity loving. Drouvelis et al. (2009)
compare behavior with and without common priors as a means for understanding adjustment
behavior in signaling games. Kocher and Trautmann (2010) study selection either into an
auction for risky project or into one with ambiguous prospects and find that most subjects
select into the risky market. Jamison and Karlan (2009) report that in an experimental
auction game for which both players should theoretically prefer that private valuations not
be common knowledge, players do earn higher profits without the information, but many
of them choose to have the information anyway. This preference is attributed to ambiguity
aversion. 1
The second line of research our work is related to is the experimental analysis of market
entry games. A market entry game with the basic features of business entry situations was
first studied in the experiments by Daniel Kahneman (1988), and was then explored more
thoroughly by Amnon Rapoport and his colleagues (Rapoport et al. 1998; Rapoport et al.
2002a; Rapoport et al. 2002b). Rapoport et al. (2000) is the first study that analyzes entry
in a two-market entry game.
Pogrebna and Schade (2009) go one step further and study a two-market entry game in
which markets are heterogeneous with respect to capacity, entry costs and potential payoﬀs.
One common characteristic of all the market entry experiments above is that the entry
decision is made under a given market capacity. In our design market capacity is uncertain,
1For a synthetic overview of uncertainty issues see Wakker (2008).
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a feature that we consider to be characteristic of many, particularly new markets. We believe
that our combination of two markets with the presence of exogenous uncertainty yields a
useful simplified representation on entrepreneurial entry environments.
The third related research line relates to broader business and economic issues. "Excess
entry" into markets and high rates of business failure are important economic phenomena.
Dunne et al. (1988) estimate that 61.5 percent of all entrants exited within five years and
79.6 percent exited within ten years in the four-digit U.S. manufacturing industries. Most
of these exits were failures. (see also Shapiro and Khemani, 1987; Dunne et al., 1989a, b;
Geroski, 1991; Baldwin, 1995; Wu and Knott, 2006).
Some possible explanations of overentry have been developed. A long history of en-
trepreneurship literature has asserted that it is entrepreneurs’ risk bearing characteristics
and ambition that lead to excess entry. More recently, in two diﬀerent experimental stud-
ies, Camerer and Lovallo (1999) find that overentry results from entrepreneurs’ overconfi-
dence when making decisions, while Grieco et al. (2007) suggest that it is related to their
self-assessed competence and emphasize the eﬀects of feelings of competence in economic
activity. All these studies focus on the importance of entrepreneurial personality in under-
standing overentry. Entrepreneurial personality is one way to understand overentry into
markets. However, more common human tendencies may also be a factor. It is also possible
that the presence of imprecise information about relevant market parameters may play a
role in inducing over-entry in a context like the entry game we study here.
We present data from three diﬀerent treatments. Our focus is on behavior in a two-
market entry game. In this game, each player has three options. One is not entering any
of the markets and obtaining a payoﬀ with certainty. The other two choices are entering
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into one of two markets with uncertain capacities in which payoﬀs will depend both on the
capacity realization and on the number of entrants. In the risky information market there are
two possible market capacities, both known to occur with probability 1/2. In the ambiguous
information market the two possible market capacities eﬀectively also occur with probability
1/2 but participants are only told that there is uncertainty about capacities.
The data exhibit over-entry in both the risky and the ambiguous market. We also find
that average entry is higher under ambiguous information than under risky information.
What drives the ambiguity-seeking behavior we find? One possibility is that it is the fact
that risk and ambiguity are jointly present in the two-market entry game. Indeed, Fox and
Tversky (1995) and Chow and Sarin (2001) report that diﬀerences in behavior between a sit-
uation of ambiguity and one with known probabilities disappear when behavior is measured
in a non-comparative environment. Although in those studies the comparative environment
led to ambiguity aversion, while in our two-market game we observe that subjects are com-
paratively attracted by ambiguity, it may still be a relevant factor in our case. Another
possibility is that it is the joint presence of exogenous and strategic uncertainty that causes
the behavior we observe.
We use two treatments to test separately for these two factors. In one treatment, we
remove the strategic interaction but still let players face a risky and an ambiguous situa-
tion simultaneously. Specifically, subjects can choose to participate in a lottery with risky
information and another one with ambiguous information. We refer to this treatment as
the individual choice situation. In the other treatment, we remove the comparative eﬀects
of risk and ambiguity but keep the strategic game setting. Here we compare the behavior
of subjects that can choose to enter a market with stochastic market capacity and risky in-
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formation and another one with the same distribution of stochastic capacity but ambiguous
information about it. In other words, strategic interaction under risky and ambiguous in-
formation takes place separately (between subjects) and is compared later. We refer to this
treatment as the one-market entry game. The results from the individual choice situation
and from the one-market entry game show no diﬀerence in the attitude towards risk and to-
wards ambiguity. Taken together these results are not compatible either with a comparative
ignorance explanation or with one based on the joint presence of exogenous and strategic
uncertainty.2
Our results can be summarized as follows. In relation to the excess-entry literature
discussed above we can say that the combination of the presence of two markets and of
uncertainty does induce excess-entry and more so if the information about market capacities
is ambiguous. The higher entry under ambiguous information can no be explained either by
the joint presence of exogenous and strategic uncertainty or by a comparative ignorance type
argument. Perhaps it is the higher complexity of the situation that triggers less thoughtful
and more impulsive decisions leading to over-entry exacerbated under ambiguous informa-
tion.3In the final section of the paper we come back to this. Given that natural environments
are invariably complex our two-market entry game may be a useful instrument for analyzing
entry issues.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces our treatments and the
2Note that if we had only run one of the two treatments, we could have incorrectly concluded that one
of the two explanations discussed above was the correct one. See Abbink and Brandts (2008) for another
market experiment in which two treatments yields results that are contradictory with each and Abbink and
Brandts (forthcoming) for a discussion of what one can learn from complex market environments like ours.
3In a very diﬀerent line of research, psychologists have used the concept of ambiguity tolerance (Furn-
ham and Ribchester 1995) to refer to the way an individual perceives and processes information about
ambiguous situations when confronted by an array of unfamiliar and complex clues. Complexity in strategic
environments may arouse the tolerance for ambiguity in some people.
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theoretical benchmarks. the market entry game and characterizes its equilibria. Section 3
presents the results. Section 4 contains the conclusions.
2 Experimental Treatments and Theoretical Benchmarks
In this section we first present the three treatment in detail, then move to our parame-
ter choices and the theoretical benchmarks and end with description of our experimental
procedures and participants.
Treatments
Our design is composed of three treatments. Treatment 1 is a two-market entry game
with uncertain capacities in both markets. Treatment 2 is an individual choice situation,
where individuals face two lotteries without any strategic interaction. Treatment 3 is a one-
market game with uncertain capacity. Treatment 1 - involving two markets - is our central
treatment. Being the most complex treatment, one can consider it to be the one closest
to the natural environments we are interested in. Treatments 2 and 3 control for the two
sources of complexity present in the two-market game.
Treatment 1: A two-market entry game.
This entry game is played by a group of 7 players facing two independent markets. Each
player  has to choose - simultaneously with and independently from the other players -
whether to stay out ( = ) for a fixed payoﬀ 12 or enter one of the markets ( =  ) or
( = ). Payoﬀs are linear in the number of entrants and are computed from the following
formula, which is common knowledge:
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i∂ 
12, if Si  X
12  2cY − mY, if Si  Y
12  2cZ − mZ, if Si  Z,
where  ( =  ) is the market capacity in market  and  and  are the numbers
of actual entrants, (including subject ), into the two markets, with 0 ≤  + ≤ 7.
In both markets capacity was uncertain and could independently take a low value  or a
high value . Participants knew that, if they entered either of the markets, they would face
an uncertain capacity. The way of operationalizing the uncertainty about market capacities
is one of the important design choices.
For both markets the probability for the two capacity levels was  = 1
2
, drawn indepen-
dently for each period. However, the information about  was diﬀerent for the two markets,
being precise in one market and ambiguous in the other market. In the market with precise
information, market  , subjects were explicitly told that capacity  was from one of the
two values  and  each occurring with probability 1
2
. We will refer to this situation of an
uncertain capacity with known probability as one involving risk.
In the market with ambiguous information about market capacities, market , subjects
only knew that capacity  was from one of the two values  and  and that the probability
of the two capacity levels was constant across all periods. We will refer to this situation of
an uncertain capacity with unknown probability as one involving ambiguity.
The probability we used for the market with ambiguous information - the true probability
- was  = 1
2
, just as in the market with precise information. In making this choice we were
guided by the simple idea that if a prior is not known, it is reasonable to assume that
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subjects will start with a uniform prior.4This idea, often called the principle of indiﬀerence
or the principle of insuﬃcient reason, has a long tradition, going back to Jacob Bernouilli
and Laplace. We feel that  = 1
2
is a good starting point for the kind of comparison we are
interested in. In our context, it has to be related to the fact that subjects make decisions
repeatedly; more on this below.
In both markets the low and high capacity levels were 11 and 31, respetively. 5 The
realizations of  and  for the twomarkets over the 50 periods were generated by the computer.
Two observations are important here. First, we used two realizations in the diﬀerent sessions
of treatment 1, as well as in treatments 2 and 3. In half of the sessions of treatment 1, we
used realization 1 for market  and realization 2 for market . In the other half of the
sessions, we switched the two realizations for the two markets, so that now realization 2 was
used for market  and realization 1 for market . This controls for sampling error and,
hence, facilitates the comparison between behavior in the two markets.
Second, we generated realizations of the sequence of capacities before the experiments
took place and chose two realizations in which two values appears quite evenly around 25
periods out of 50 periods. We wanted to avoid results distorted by extreme sequences of
values of  and . Below we will explain how the two realizations were used in treatments 2
and 3.
Treatment 2: An individual choice situation.
In this treatment players choose between a safe choice and two lotteries, which are con-
structed using the payoﬀ functions of treatment 1, discussed above. Similarly to treatment
4Drouvelis et al. (2009) also use this assumption.
5By choosing these non-integer values we avoid multiple equilibria in the game; more on this below.
8
1,  and  are random variables that take values 1.1 and 3.1 with probability  = 12 . The
variables  and  in treatment 1 have been set equal to 2.1, so as to make a risk-neutral
decision-maker indiﬀerent between choosing the safe choice  or either of the safe lotteries
 and . As for treatment 2, information about the random variable was precise for lottery
 and ambiguous for lottery .6
The payoﬀ function for this treatment was the following:
i∂ 
12, if Si  X
12  2cY − 2. 1, if Si  Y
12  2cZ − 2. 1, if Si  Z
Without interaction there are no equilibria to consider. The issue here will be a simple
comparison between the frequency of choice Y and that of Z.
Treatment 3: A one-market entry game
This treatment consists of two subtreatments: a one-market entry game with uncertain
capacity and precise information about capacities and an analogous game with ambiguous
information about capacities. A one-market entry game is played by a group of 5 players
who must decide simultaneously and independently whether to enter a market ( =  ) or
to stay out ( = ). The payoﬀ to player i ’s is computed from the following formula, which
is common knowledge:
i∂  6, if S
i  X
6  2c − m, if Si  Y
Where choice  denotes a market with risky or ambiguous capacities. 0 ≤  ≤ 5 is
the number of subjects (including subject ) choosing  .  is the actual market capacity
6The value 2.1 is quite close to the pure strategy equilibrium number of entrants in the strategic game in
Treatment 1.
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occurring in a certain period.
2.1 Theoretical Benchmarks and Parameter Choices
For the two treatments with interaction, the equilibria of the one-shot game yield theoretical
benchmarks to which the data can be compared. In what follows we describe the equilibria
based on the assumption that players evaluate ambiguous information about uncertainty in
the same way as precise information. For the two-market game of treatment 1 there are
 !∗ !∗ !( −∗ −∗)! pure strategy equilibria with ∗ = || ( =  ), where || is
the largest integer smaller than the expected value of capacities in market , .
Additionally, there is a symmetric mixed Nash equilibrium with entry probability of firm
 in market  given by  = (+(1−))−1−1 . Note that the expected number of entrants in
the symmetric mixed equilibrium is  ∗, which is diﬀerent from but can be very close to
the pure strategy equilibria value ∗ .
Given that there were 7 players and the capacities in both markets where  = 11 and
 = 31 with  = 1
2
, the pure strategy Nash equilibria have 2 players entering each of the
two markets (and three staying out), while the symmetric mixed strategy Nash equilibrium
predicts an individual entry probability 0183 and the expected number of entrants in each
of the markets being 1281.
As shown above, for the one-market games of treatment 3 we chose diﬀerent parameters.
There were now five players and  = 21 and  = 41 with  = 1
2
. Pure strategy Nash
equilibria have 3 players entering and 2 players staying out. Symmetric mixed strategy Nash
equilibria predict an entry probability 0525 and the expected number of entrants 2625.
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What is the rationale behind the parameter choices for the two entry games? First, we
choose  and  to be non-integers so that there exists only one pure equilibrium number of
entrants 7. At the same time, the values are close to an integer so that in equilibrium the
payoﬀ diﬀerence to those entering one market and those staying out remains quite small.
Second, the outside option, the capacity and the number of of players in a group all
diﬀered between the two and the one-market treatments, wtih values of 12, 1131 and 7
in treatment 1 and of 6, 2141 and 5 in treatment 2. We chose these values to keep the
equilibrium choices more comparable. For the pure strategy equilibria, the two-market entry
game In treatment 1 has 3 players always choosing Out and 4 players always choosing Entry
(2 in each market), so that the ratio of Out to Entry choices is 34. While the one market
entry game has 2 players always choosing Out and 3 players always choosing Entry. The
ratio of Out to Entry is her 23, which we judged to be close to 34.
For the mixed strategy equilibria of the two-market game of treatment 1 the expected
number of entrants is 2562 = 1281 + 1281, while the expected number of entrants in the
one-market game is 2625, a number rather close to 2562.
In most of the literature on repeated play of market entry games in fixed matching, indi-
viduals’ coordination on the behavior of others lead to an asymmetric pure equilibrium even
though such play may take a long time to emerge. In the present experiments, under coexis-
tence of uncertain capacity and multimarket settings, coordination among players becomes
very hard. Given the assumption of identical incentives among players, one might think that
the mixed symmetric equilibrium is particularly salient.
In treatment 2, the lottery treatment, payoﬀs of each individual are independent of other
7If  and  are integers, there exists two pure equilibria entrant numbers.
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players. In the payoﬀ formula we set a fixed value 21 in the place of the number of entrants
. This number is close to the pure strategy equilibrium entrant number 2 in treatment 1.
2.2 Procedures
The experimental procedures for all three treatments follow the same steps. At the beginning
of a session subjects received the instructions on paper. The instructions were worded in
neutral terms, without any reference to markets. After the instructions had been read aloud
by one of the experimenters, subjects completed a set of review questions on the computer
terminals to test their understanding of the instructions. They could not finish this part
until they had answered all the questions correctly. In the instructions subjects were told
that they would have to make one choice between two options (treatment 3) or between
three options (treatments 1 and 3) in each of the periods of the session, and that they would
play the same game repeatedly in 50 consecutive periods. In treatments 1 and 3 - involving
strategic interaction - subject were told that they would play the 50 periods with the same
group with fixed partners.
In order to ensure that subjects clearly understood the payoﬀs resulting from choosing to
enter a market, the instructions also included payoﬀ tables showing all possible payoﬀ values
from choosing entry. Such payoﬀ tables were shown to subjects in each period. In each
period all subjects made decisions simultaneously without communication among them. For
the case of ambiguous information fixed matching raises the possibility that subjects choose
the option with ambiguous information to learn more about the true underlying distribution
of capacities. In the results section we take this possibility into account.
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We use fixed matching based on the following considerations. First, it makes it easier
to obtain many statistically independent observations. Second, it facilitates comparability
with previous studies of market entry games most if which also use fixed matching.
At the end of one period, the only information they received is their own payoﬀs and
their payoﬀ history. This kind of information feedback tries to simulate the situation in the
field, where entrepreneurs face both competitors and variable market conditions. They are
only able to know the final result of their decisions, such as their payoﬀs, but not how their
payoﬀs result from the interaction of the two factors.
In addition, this information feedback makes it hard for subjects to learn the probabilities
about capacities and others’ strategies for the case of ambiguous information.8
2.3 Participants
184 students from the Universitat Autónoma de Barcelona of Spain participated in our
experiments. They were recruited through e-mail invitations on an experimental recruiting
website using the ORSEE system9. Each subject was only allowed to participate in a single
session that lasted around 45 minutes. 84 students participated in Treatment 1 in 12 groups
of seven, and we ran four sessions10 with 21 subjects seated in each session. 25 students
participated in Treatment 2, and we ran two sessions11 with 12 subjects and 13 subjects in
8Some seminar participants have asked why our design did not include the elicitation of beliefs about
others’ behavior. The answer is that given in our interest in connecting our work to some field-issues we
thought it more natural to avoid belief elicitation at this point.
9Greiner, B., (2004). An Online Recruitment System ORSEE.
10As mentioned above, for the realizations of capacities  and , in two sessions we use realization 1 for
the risky market and realization 2 for the ambiguous market; in the other two sessions, we switch the two
realizations between the two markets.
11Here in one session we use realization 1 for the risky market and realization 2 for the ambiguous market;
in the other session, we switch the two realizations between the two markets.
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each session. 75 students participated in treatment 3 in 8 groups of five and 7 groups of five
separately, and we ran two separate sessions for the one-market game with risk and with the
one-market game with ambiguity.12
3 Experimental Results
Our experimental results are separated in two parts. We first present the results pertaining
to the two-market entry games. In the second part, we report the experimental results of the
one-market entry game and the individual choice game. We will relate the data in the two
parts to explain why and how people deal with uncertain information of risk and ambiguity
in strategic games.
3.1 Results of the two-market entry game
In this section, we analyze entry behavior moving from the aggregate level to the group
level and finally to the individual level. We first look at the aggregate number of entrants
of all subjects in risky and ambiguous markets over 50 periods, then do the same by group
and, finally, we examine individual decision processes. We summarize our findings in three
results. We first state each result and then present the evidence that supports it. Our first
result pertains to the direct comparison of entry into the two markets.
Result 1: The number of entrants into the ambiguous market is higher
than that into the risky market. This diﬀerence diminishes over time but
does not disappear.
12Here in the one-market game with risky information, we use realization 1 in one session and realization
2 in the other session. We do the same in the one-market game with ambiguous information.
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We get into the heart of the matter by comparing the numbers of entrants over time
in the risky information and ambiguous information markets. The two panels of Figure 1
show the number of entrants into the two markets, averaged over all groups, by period and
averaged over every 5 periods respectively. In the upper panel, one can see that in the first
four periods there is a large diﬀerence in the number of entrants in the ambiguous market
(with the highest value around 3) and the risky market (with the lowest value around 1).
From then on the number of entrants in both markets fluctuates between 15 and 25. The
impression is that the number in the ambiguous market is higher than the number in the
risky market in most periods, but the diﬀerence is not very clear in the final periods.
The lower panel of Figure 1 shows the average number of entrants averaged over every 5
periods. One can see that the number of entrants in the risky market is always slightly below
the pure strategy equilibrium value 2 and is always above the mixed strategy equilibrium
value 1281. Comparatively, the number in the ambiguous market is always above 2 except
for the value pertaining to periods 36-40. Figure 1 suggests that there is a preference for
entering into the ambiguous market rather than into the risky market. The diﬀerence in
mean entrants in the two markets becomes smaller and both values get closer to the pure
strategy equilibrium value 2 in the final periods.
Table 1 gives a complementary view of the data shown in Figure 1. It shows the dis-
tribution of the number of entrants ( = 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7) into each of the two markets
in the first 25, the last 25 and all 50 periods, respectively. The numbers listed in the table
denote the number of times the two markets had the eight possible numbers of entrants.
Observe two important features of the data shown in the table. First,  = 2 is the mode
both for ambiguity and for risk. Second, for each of the numbers of entrants  ≤ 2 (i.e.,
15
00.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 31 33 35 37 39 41 43 45 47 49
Period
Me
an
 n
um
be
r 
of
 e
nt
ra
nt
s
Risk Ambiguity 
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
1--5 6--10 11--15 16--20 21--25 26--30 31--35 36--40 41--45 46--50
Period
Me
an
 n
um
be
r 
of
 e
nt
ra
nt
s
Risk Ambiguity
Figure 1: Mean number of entrants by period (top) and by every five periods (bottom) in
Treatment 1
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including no entry), the numbers of entrants into the risky markets are higher than those
of entrants into the ambiguous markets. Comparatively, for 7    2, the numbers of
entrants into the ambiguous markets are higher than those of the entrants of risky markets.
The numbers shown in Table 1 confirm the impression that, on average, there is more entry
into the ambiguous information market.
Table 1. Distribution of the number of entrants in Treatment 1
Periods1-25 Periods 26-50 Periods1-50
Entrants Risk Ambiguity Risk Ambiguity Risk Ambiguity
0 34 13 23 10 57 23
1 95 75 93 82 188 157
2 99 99 99 121 198 220
3 51 76 67 62 118 138
4 19 29 16 20 35 49
5 2 5 2 5 4 10
6 0 3 0 0 0 3
7 0 0 0 0 0 0
We now move to looking at more disaggregated data. Table 2 reports the mean number
of entry into the two markets for each of the twelve groups; standard deviations appear in
parentheses, both for the first and the last 25 of the total 50 periods. In periods 1-25, the
mean for ambiguity is higher than that for risk for all 12 groups. In periods 26-50, the same
holds except for group 1 and group 2.
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T a b le 2 . O b s e rve d m e a n num b e r o f e n tra n ts b y g ro up
in T re a tm e n t 1
P e r i o d s 1 -2 5 P e r i o d s 2 6 -5 0
R is k A m b ig u i ty R i s k A m b ig u i ty
G r .1 1 .8 2 .5 2 2 .2 4 1 .9 2
(1 .1 3 5 ) (1 .1 7 4 ) (1 .1 4 5 ) (1 .1 3 2 )
G r .2 1 .9 6 2 .4 8 2 .4 4 2 .2 4
(1 .2 1 9 ) (1 .1 7 4 ) (1 .2 3 9 ) (0 .9 0 9 )
G r .3 1 .5 6 2 .6 1 .8 2 .0 8
(1 .1 0 2 ) (0 .8 5 1 ) (0 .9 8 3 ) (0 .8 9 3 )
G r .4 1 .8 4 2 .1 6 2 2 .2 8
(1 .0 1 0 ) (1 .0 4 9 ) (0 .6 9 5 ) (0 .9 2 0 )
G r .5 1 .7 6 2 .3 6 1 .9 6 2 .3 6
(1 .1 7 9 ) (1 .0 5 7 ) (0 .8 2 6 ) (1 .1 3 0 )
G r .6 1 .8 2 .2 1 .7 2 2 .6
(1 .0 2 3 ) (1 .0 6 1 ) (0 .9 2 0 ) (1 .1 3 5 )
G r .7 1 .8 2 .4 8 1 .7 6 1 .9 2
(1 .0 6 1 ) (0 .9 0 2 ) (1 .0 7 2 ) (0 .6 2 9 )
G r .8 1 .6 1 .7 6 1 .2 8 1 .3 2
(0 .9 8 3 ) (1 .3 6 9 ) (0 .9 2 0 ) (0 .9 7 1 )
G r .9 2 .1 2 2 .1 2 2 .1 2 1 .8
(1 .0 7 3 ) (1 .1 8 0 ) (1 .1 8 0 ) (0 .9 8 3 )
G r .1 0 1 .7 2 1 .7 2 1 .4 8 1 .6 4
(1 .2 5 3 ) (0 .9 6 3 ) (1 .1 0 3 ) (0 .8 4 5 )
G r .1 1 1 .4 4 1 .6 8 1 .5 6 1 .8 8
(0 .8 0 6 ) (0 .8 8 4 ) (0 .7 5 5 ) (0 .7 1 3 )
G r .1 2 1 .8 8 2 .3 2 2 .2 8 2 .5 6
(1 .1 1 0 ) (1 .5 2 0 ) (0 .9 6 3 ) (0 .9 8 6 )
A ve ra g e 1 .7 7 3 2 .2 1 .8 8 7 2 .0 5
(1 .0 9 7 ) (1 .1 5 5 ) (1 .0 4 9 ) (1 .0 1 4 )
N um R is k ≥ A m b ig u it y  0 2
P ro . R is k ≥ A m b ig u it y  0 .0 0 0 .0 1 9
The next to the last row reports the p-values from a binomial test of the diﬀerence in the
entrants, based on a null hypothesis that the number of entrants is the same for ambiguity
and risk (as is true in equilibrium). The results of the text show that we can easily reject
the null hypothesis of equal entry into the two markets.
Next we compare observed behavior to the theoretical benchmark behavior presented in
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section 2.
Result 2: Both symmetric mixed strategy and pure strategy equilibrium
strategies fail to explain individual behavior, both under risky and ambiguous
information markets. Subjects mix their entry decisions but in a way very
heterogeneous.
Recall that in the pure strategy equilibrium the number of entrants into each of the
markets is 2, while in the mixed strategy equilibrium it is 1.281. Observed average entry
rates are 1.83 for the risky market and 2.125 for the ambiguous market. These figures are
quite far from the mixed equilibrium figure and somewhat closer to the figure for the pure
equilibrium, We now look at individual behavior more closely to see to what extent it is in
line with equilibrium behavior. We start by plotting individuals’ proportions of entry into
each market of the two markets. The two panels of Figure 2 show individual entry frequencies
in periods 1-25 and periods 26-50 respectively. Both graphs plot the observed proportion
of an individual’s entry in the risky information market, shown on the X axis, against his
proportion of entry in the ambiguous information market, shown on the Y axis. Each data
point is based on 25 observations for each individual. For example, the points on the diagonal
line OB describe individuals whose entry frequencies in the two markets are the same, while
points on the diagonal line AC describe individuals whose sum of entry frequencies in the
two markets equals 1, in other words, those who never choose Out. In another example, the
points on the line OA represent individuals who never enter the risky information market. In
both panels, one can see the benchmark point indicating the mixed-strategy equilibrium13.
13The mixed strategy equilibrium value in the risky information market is 0.183. Such a prediction is based
on the assumption of risk neutrality. Symetrically, we posit the equilbrium value in the ambiguous informa-
tion market to also be 0.183 under the assumption of a neutral attitude towards risk and the application of
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Figure 2: Observed entry frequency in periods 1-25 (left) and in periods 26-50 (right) of
Treatment 1
One can see that in both panels the points representing individual entry frequencies are
scattered without any clear concentration in any particular area. Individuals clearly mix
between entry into one and the other market, but in ways which are hard to account for
by the symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium. It seems that the points are more loosely
distributed in the right graph compared with the left one and such changes may be helpful
in explaining the diminishing diﬀerence in entry into the two markets. In particular, many
points move to the edge of the graph (X axis, Y axis and the diagonal line AC).
Summarizing, subjects mix their choices but in a heterogeneous way. The observed mixed
entry behavior is far from the symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium prediction. Mixed
strategies in repeated games was studied in market entry games by Rapoport, Seale and
the principle of insuﬃcient reasoning, i. e. probability 12  for the case of unknown probability.
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Winter (2000) and Zwick and Rapoport (2002). The common characteristic in these studies
is that there are significant departures from mixed strategy equilibrium play at the individual
level, where there are many subjects who either enter too frequently or too infrequently, and
most importantly there may exist sequential dependencies that constitute adaptation and
repetition bias. This raises the question whether, in our experiment, do individuals’ decisions
follow a certain form of adaptation, such as coordination, and does individual entry behavior
converge to the pure strategy equilibrium prediction?
Figure 3 shows the number of entrants into the two markets in each group over 50
periods. We can see clearly that the numbers fluctuate even in the final periods and that no
coordination at the pure strategy equilibrium is achieved.
The results we have reported until now show that entry into the ambiguous market is
larger than into the risky market and that observed behavior is far from both the pure and
the mixed equilibrium outcomes. Our third result pertains to a more detailed analysis of
individual behavior over time. The motivation for looking at this feature of our data is
twofold. First, given that we chose an environment with repeated play it’s important to look
deeper into whether behavior changes over time. Second, the analysis of behavior over time
may yield some insights into the reasoning process behind observed behavior.
Result 3: There is more persistence when in the ambiguous market than
when in the risky market: for any payoﬀ-level staying in ambiguity is more
frequent than staying in risk.
A simple way of studying strategies in repeated situations is to observe how subjects
switch between choices. Here we are interested in studying the choices in period  based on
the case of having entered into the risky market and the ambiguous market in period − 1.
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Figure 3: Number of entrants by period by group in Treatment
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Subjects may react quite diﬀerently to payoﬀ information from a previous risky choice or a
previous ambiguous choice.
We will look at this issue by relating choices in period  to choices and the consequences of
choices in period −1 based on the aggregate observations across all subjects over 50 periods.
Table 3 reports the observed proportions of choices Out, Risk and Ambiguity in period  in
response to the payoﬀs 22, 42, 62, 82, 102, 12, 122, 142 and 162 in period −1, where we
separate the observations into three blocks depending on the sources (Out/Risk/Ambiguity)
of the payoﬀs.
The upper block in the table presents proportions in every choice in response to various
payoﬀs received in period − 1 in choosing Risk. The middle block presents proportions in
every choice in response to various payoﬀs received in period − 1 in choosing Ambiguity.
T a b le 3 . A g g r e g a te p r o p o r t i o n s o f e n t r y c h o i c e s i n p e r i o d t
i n r e s p o n s e to c h o i c e a n d p a y o f fs i n p e r i o d t − 1
P e r i o d t − 1
P a y o f fs (O b s . ) i n R i s k m a r k e t
P e r io d t 2 .2 4 .2 6 .2 8 .2 1 0 .2 1 2 .2 1 4 .2 1 6 .2 A ll p a y o f fs
( 5 ) ( 7 2 ) ( 1 9 5 ) ( 2 6 4 ) ( 2 5 8 ) ( 1 8 6 ) ( 9 9 ) ( 1 0 7 9 )
O u t 0 .6 0 .4 7 2 0 .4 0 5 0 .3 0 7 0 .2 4 4 0 .2 5 8 0 .2 2 2 0 .3 0 6
R i s k 0 .2 0 .3 6 1 0 .3 5 4 0 .4 4 3 0 .4 8 4 0 .5 3 8 0 .4 3 4 0 .4 4 6
A m b ig u i t y 0 .2 0 .1 6 7 0 .2 4 1 0 .2 5 0 .2 7 1 0 .2 0 4 0 .3 4 3 0 .2 4 8
A m b i g u i t y
O u t A m b i g u i t y 0 .2 5 0 .2 6 1 0 .3 7 3 0 .4 4 9 0 .5 2 6 0 .4 4 2 0 .6 0 7 0 .4 4 8
P a y o f fs (O b s . ) i n A m b i g u i t y m a r k e t
2 .2 4 .2 6 .2 8 .2 1 0 .2 1 2 .2 1 4 .2 1 6 .2 A ll p a y o f fs
( 1 2 ) ( 2 5 ) ( 1 2 6 ) ( 2 2 6 ) ( 2 7 4 ) ( 2 8 3 ) ( 2 2 8 ) ( 7 7 ) ( 1 2 5 1 )
O u t 0 .5 8 3 0 .6 4 0 .3 9 7 0 .3 4 5 0 .2 7 0 0 .1 8 4 0 .1 4 9 0 .1 8 2 0 .2 6 0
R i s k 0 0 .1 6 0 .2 1 4 0 .1 8 1 0 .2 2 6 0 .1 8 0 0 .2 0 2 0 .1 0 4 0 .1 9 1
A m b ig u i t y 0 .4 1 7 0 .2 0 .3 8 9 0 .4 7 3 0 .5 0 4 0 .6 3 6 0 .6 4 9 0 .7 1 4 0 .5 4 9
R i s k
O u t R i s k 0 0 .2 0 .3 5 0 0 .3 4 4 0 .4 5 6 0 .4 9 5 0 .5 7 5 0 .3 6 4 0 .4 2 4
P a y o f fs (O b s . ) i n O u t
1 2
( 1 7 8 6 )
O u t 0 .6 2 9
R i s k 0 .2 0 5
A m b ig u i t y 0 .1 6 6
R i s k
R i s k  A m b i g u i t y 0 .5 5 3
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We look at the data in two diﬀerent ways. First, we compare the proportions of staying
in Risk in the first block with the proportions of staying in Ambiguity in the second block in
response to the same payoﬀs. It describes how people stick to the same choice. In the upper
block, we observe that the proportions of staying in Risk are quite similar for various payoﬀs
in Risk in period − 1, while in the middle block, the proportions of staying in Ambiguity
increase as the payoﬀs in Ambiguity in period − 1 increase. In comparison the proportions
of people sticking to Risk is always equal or lower than those of sticking to Ambiguity in
response to the same payoﬀ level, and the diﬀerence becomes larger for high payoﬀ levels.
How can these diﬀerences be explained? Taking the payoﬀ information of 14.2 and 16.2 as
an example, this payoﬀ information implies that the capacity is high and there are 2 and 1
entrants in the market, respectively, in the period. However, it seems that people react to
it diﬀerently depending on whether such information stems from a risky or an ambiguous
market. For a payoﬀ of 16.2 the frequency of sticking to the risky market is 0.434 and 0.714
in the ambiguous market, for a payoﬀ of 14.2 the frequency of sticking to the risky market is
0.538 and 0.649 in the ambiguous market and the same direction of the inequality holds for
all other payoﬀ levels except 4.2, where the two relevant frequencies are equal. People tend
to stick more to their previous choice if they had chosen to enter an ambiguous market.
The second way of looking at the data of table 3 is to study switches in decisions. On
the one hand, we make a comparison of switches from one market to the other market. The
proportions of switches from an ambiguous market to a risky market in response to most
payoﬀ levels are slightly lower than from a risky to an ambiguous market. On the other
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hand, we study how they make decisions between the other two choices once they deviate
from the one choice. The expression in the last row, + , in the upper block and
the expression, + , in the middle block describe the percentages of entering ambiguity
or risk proportions when switching out of risky or ambiguous choices of period  − 1. The
value + increases as the amount of payoﬀs increases, while the value + reacts
little to diﬀerent payoﬀs. It seems that when people switch out of a risky market, they prefer
ambiguous market to staying out, while when they switch out of an ambiguous market, they
may be not very interested in entering in risk. To conclude our description of the data of
Table 3, individuals prefer to stay in Ambiguity and are more likely to switch from Risk to
Ambiguity than from Ambiguity to Risk.
We can also look at switches in decisions at the group level, aggregated over 50 periods.
Table 4 reports the observed proportions of choices Out, Risk and Ambiguity in each group
in period  in response to choices Out, Risk and Ambiguity in period − 1 respectively. The
proportions of sticking to the same choice are, except for group 4 and group 5, higher for
Ambiguity are higher than for Risk. The proportions of switching to Ambiguity are higher
than those of switching to Risk in all the 12 groups. All the observations in Table 3 and 4
suggest that there exists more persistence in the Ambiguous information market.
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Tab le 4 . P ropo rtions by g roup o f entry cho ices in pe riod t
in response to cho ice and payo ffs in pe riod t − 1
Period t − 1
Ris k Am biguity Out
R is k (P eriod t ) G r.1 0.485 0.236 0.179
G r.2 0.430 0.256 0.277
G r.3 0.354 0.113 0.274
G r.4 0.479 0.309 0.122
G r.5 0.626 0.164 0.125
G r.6 0.437 0.129 0.243
G r.7 0.517 0.234 0.116
G r.8 0.338 0.132 0.194
G r.9 0.311 0.240 0.348
G r.10 0.375 0.160 0.198
G r.11 0.438 0.149 0.164
G r.12 0.53 0.15 0.252
Am biguity (P eriod t ) G r.1 0.253 0.582 0.149
G r.2 0.262 0.479 0.261
G r.3 0.244 0.670 0.123
G r.4 0.372 0.473 0.158
G r.5 0.187 0.612 0.199
G r.6 0.253 0.603 0.193
G r.7 0.303 0.617 0.095
G r.8 0.169 0.421 0.163
G r.9 0.311 0.417 0.163
G r.10 0.2 0.580 0.109
G r.11 0.219 0.552 0.126
G r.12 0.17 0.533 0.325
Out (P eriod t ) G r.1 0.263 0.182 0.672
G r.2 0.308 0.265 0.462
G r.3 0.402 0.217 0.603
G r.4 0.149 0.218 0.719
G r.5 0.187 0.224 0.676
G r.6 0.310 0.267 0.564
G r.7 0.180 0.150 0.789
G r.8 0.493 0.447 0.643
G r.9 0.377 0.343 0.489
G r.10 0.425 0.259 0.692
G r.11 0.342 0.299 0.710
G r.12 0.3 0.317 0.423
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Table 5 shows the results of a multinomial logit regression analysis to test the findings
above. In the regression, the dependent variable is the action chosen by one subject in
period ,  ∈ {0 1 2} where 0, 1 and 2 denote staying out, entering in risk and in ambiguity
respectively. The logit regression is of the form:
( = ) = exp(0++++)
1+
2=0 exp(0++++)
Here,  is an individual’s payoﬀ,  is a dummy variable indicating one’s choice of entering
risky market ( = 1),  is a dummy variable indicating one’s choice of entering ambiguous
market ( = 1) and  is a dummy variable indicating the female ( = 1) in period  − 1.
Our goal is to associate the entry choices in period  with profits and entry choices in period
 − 1. Since there are multiple entry choices, we choose the first choice ( = 0) the base
choice as the comparison group. The output above has two parts, labeled with the outcome
variable (). They correspond to two equations:
( (=1) (=0)) = 0 +  + + + 
( (=2) (=0)) = 0 +  + + + 
with bs being the raw coeﬃcients listed in Table 5.
For example, we can say that for dummy variable ambiguity=1 (compared with am-
biguity=0), ( (=1) (=0)) will be increased by 1024, and ( (=2) (=0)) will be increased by
2327. Similarly, for dummy variable risk=1 (compared with ambiguity=0), ( (=1) (=0)) will
be increased by 1623, and ( (=2) (=0)) will be increased by 1262. All the coeﬃcients are
significant at level 1% when clustered by group.
Therefore, we can say that, in general, both a choice of ambiguity and a choice of risk in
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period − 1 will increase one’s preference to entering in risk ( = 1) or ambiguity ( = 2)
compared with the outside choice of a fixed payoﬀ.
From another angle, ( (=2) (=1)) will be increased by 1306 (= 2314−1008) when facing
 = 2 in period −1. ( (=1) (=2)) will increase by 0355 (= 1598−1243) when facing  = 1
in period  − 1. We observe persistence (of positive values) in both markets and stronger
eﬀects (( (=2) (=1))  ( (=1) (=2))) in ambiguous markets.
Table 5. Multilogit regression model of entry decision in
period t in response to choice and payoffs in period t − 1
Entry(t) (compared with Out)
Risk Ambituity
ln P S1 P S0  ln
P S2 
P S0 
Profit(t-1) 0. 125 ∗ 0. 166 ∗
0. 019 0. 018
Dummy (risk1 at t-1) 1. 623 ∗ 1. 262 ∗
0. 096 0. 107
Dummy (ambiguity1 at t-1) 1. 024 ∗ 2. 327 ∗
0. 110 0. 100
constant −2. 622 ∗ −3. 321 ∗
0. 238 0. 228
Prochi2 0. 0000
Wald chi2(6) 885. 50
Num. of Obs. 4116
Pseudo R2 0. 1000
∗significant at the 1% level, clustered by group.
This higher persistence in the market with ambiguous information is not easy to interpret.
It is compatible with the notion that, under risk, participants have more self-control over
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their behavior and stick more to a pattern of switching between markets intended to make
their behavior unpredictable. In contrast, the higher persistence under ambiguity can be
interpreted as the result of a more unreflective tendency to simply stick to a decision which
has yielded a positive payoﬀ. Note that the diﬀerences in the frequencies of staying in
the same market tends to be higher for the higher payoﬀ levels 14.2 and 16.2 than for the
lower ones 4.2 and 6.2. This suggests that, without precise information about the exogenous
probability, subjects lose some control over their decisions and this eﬀect is stronger when
they receive high payoﬀs.
3.2 Results of the individual choice game and the one-market en-
try game
The previous section raises two questions about how to explain the results. Does ambiguity
seeking result from players interacting in strategic environments? Does it result from the
information type itself or from the comparative eﬀects between information types? In this
section we provide answers to these questions. As before, we first state a result and then
discuss the support we have for it,
Result 4: There is no diﬀerence in the number of entrants between the risky
information lottery and the ambiguous information lottery in Treatment 2.
The two graphs in Figure 4 report the aggregate proportions of entry into each of the
markets by period and by every 5 periods respectively. The two lines in each graph describe
the entry proportions of all individuals into each market and the changes over 50 periods.
The two lines are at approximately the same level. The number in both markets decreases
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Figure 4: Percentage of choices by period (top) and by every 5 periods (bottom) in Treatment
2
from the interval [03 05] to the interval [02 03] in period 11, and the value keeps very
stable till the final periods. The results of the individual choice game in Treatment 2 report
no diﬀerence between choice of risk and ambiguity.
We can also look at individual data to compare entry frequencies in both markets. Table 6
(analogous to table 4 for Treatment 1) reports the proportions of entry into the two markets
in the first 25 and the last 25 periods respectively by individual in the game, for all 25
subjects. The last three rows in the table show the statistics on the number of subjects
who enter more in Risk, those who enter in Risk and Ambiguity with equal frequencies, and
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those who enter more in Ambiguity, which are 12, 3 and 10 respectively in periods 1-25 and
are 10, 7 and 8 respectively in periods 26-50. Subjects behave heterogeneously and there
are no clear indications for a preference for either market, either in the first or in the last
25 periods. Both Table 6 and Figure 4 show no clear tendency of entering more into either
market.
Table 6. Observed proportions of entry by individual in Treatment 2
Periods 1-25 Periods 26-50
Subject Risk Ambiguity Risk Ambiguity
1 0.52 0.44 0.64 0.36
2 0.36 0.36 0.04 0.56
3 0.2 0 0 0
4 0.4 0.28 0.12 0
5 0.16 0.84 0.68 0.24
6 0.32 0.6 0 0.8
7 0.16 0.08 0.16 0
8 0.48 0.04 0.2 0.68
9 0.44 0.08 0.76 0
10 0.68 0.16 0.56 0.04
11 0.68 0.2 0.2 0.24
12 0 0 0 0
13 0.44 0.4 0.36 0.52
14 0 0.48 0 0
15 0.28 0.36 0.64 0.16
16 0.4 0.44 0.6 0.28
17 0.2 0.56 0.44 0.44
18 0.16 0.56 0 0.52
19 0.28 0.36 0.16 0.4
20 0.04 0.08 0 0
21 0.4 0.36 0.4 0.44
22 0.16 0.08 0.04 0.04
23 0.6 0.24 0.28 0.2
24 0.44 0.44 0.28 0.56
25 0 0.76 0 0
Average 0.312 0.328 0.262 0.259
Num. Risk  Ambiguity 12 10
Num. Risk  Ambiguity 3 7
Num. Risk  Ambiguity 10 8
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Result 4 clarifies two facts. First, it is not simply that repeated play of the game leads
to more choices of ambiguity in an attempt of sampling the distribution and finding out the
true probability. We observe a slight overentry into the ambiguous information market only
in the first 5 periods, but this is not long enough to figure out the probability information
of the ambiguous information market. Second, without strategic interaction, individuals are
indiﬀerent between the two markets, so that the result for the two-market case is not simply
due to a comparison eﬀect of the type reported in Fox and Tversky (1995). We now move
to our final result.
Result 5: There is no diﬀerence in the number of entrants when players
face risky or ambiguous information in a one-market entry game in Treatment
3.
The two panels of Figure 5 show number of entrants into the two markets, averaged over
all groups, by period and averaged over every 5 periods respectively. Recall that here the
data from two separate market games played between subjects. As in Figure 4, we find
that the two lines indicating risky information and ambiguous information overlap over all
50 periods. At the beginning, the mean numbers of entrants in both types of information
are higher than both the mixed strategy equilibrium number 2625 and the pure strategy
equilibrium number 3, and they are around the pure strategy equilibrium level 3 in the
middle periods of the game, but increase again somewhat in the final periods to the original
level. Hence we can conclude that the result in our two-market game is not due to the
existence of strategic interaction.
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Figure 5: Mean number of entrants by period (top) and by every 5 periods (bottom) in
Treatment 3
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4 Summary and Conclusions
Our experiments find ambiguity seeking in a strategic two-market entry game, but no am-
biguity eﬀects in either an individual choice problem or a one-market entry game. The
ambiguity-seeking behavior we find is striking since most previous studies on ambiguity find
that people prefer to avoid situations with ambiguous information. A tight explanation of
our results is hard to formulate. However, we conjecture that in strategic games ambiguity
eﬀects may depend on the strategic complexity of the games. The aversion to ambiguity has
been widely documented mostly in individual decision-making environments. In contrast,
strategic complexity together with ambiguous information may make people feel competent
and overconfident vis-à-vis the competition. In a complex environment the competition may
trigger over-entry and this tendence is strengthened when the probabilities about the state of
the market are unknown. The idea of overconfidence and competence in economic decisions
goes back at least as far as Adam Smith (1776) in the The Wealth of Nations. There Smith
argues that people systematically overestimate their chances of success in any venture.
Our results are in consonance with some previous studies on entry. Camerer and Lovallo
(1999) is the only study of market entry games to explain over-entry in the field. They in-
clude a potentially potent psychological variable – relative skill perception–in market entry
games. They create a paradigm in which entrants’ payoﬀs depend on their skill to measure
business entry decisions and personal overconfidence simultaneously. The results show that
overconfidence about relative ability can trigger excess entry. Grieco et al. (2007) is the
only other research which uses ambiguity to explain excess entry. However, instead of using
strategic games with interaction among players, individuals receive their own private am-
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biguous information and make choices in isolation. The results suggest that entrepreneurial
entry decisions can be explained by ambiguity seeking influenced by feelings of competence.
We believe that decision making in strategic environment with ambiguous information is
a very common situation in the field, but is poorly understood. Hsu et al. (2005) study the
neural basis of decisions under risk and ambiguity and find that there is a general neural
circuit responding to diﬀerent degrees of uncertainty, contrary to decision theory. There
appears to be a long way to go in understanding behavior under ambiguity and more field
experimental and brain studies will be needed to better understand this issue.
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APPENDIX: Instruction of the two-market entry game
General Information
The purpose of this experiment is to study how people make decisions in a particular
situation. From now on and till the end of the experiment any communication with other
participants is not permitted. If you have a question, please raise your hand and one of us
will come to your desk to answer it.
You will receive 4 euros for showing up on time for the experiment. In addition, you will
make money during the experiment. Upon completion of the experiment the amount that
you make will be paid to you in cash. Payments are confidential; no other participant will
be told the amount you make.
Rounds and Groups:
This experiment will have 50 rounds. In each round you will be in a group with 6 other
participants, totally 7 people. The members in your group will be fixed in all rounds. You
will not be informed of the identity of people who you are playing with neither during the
experiment nor in the end of the experiment.
Description of the Decision Task(s) in the Experiment:
In each round, you are asked to make a choice between one of three possible actions,
action “”, action “ .” or action "". If you choose action , you will receive a fixed
amount of money. If you choose  , your payoﬀ will depend on the state of the world and
the choice of other participants in your group. Given certain state of the world, the less
the number of  chosen by your group, the higher your payoﬀs is in choosing action  . If
you choose , your payoﬀ will depend on the state of the world and the choice of other
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participants in your group. Given certain state of the world, the less the number of  chosen
by your group, the higher your payoﬀs is in choosing action .
The state of the world in action  will be high or low. When you make your decision
you do not know it is high or low. However, all of you know the probabilities of high or low.
The state of the world in action  will be high or low. When you make your decision
you do not know it is high or low, and you also do NOT know the probabilities of high or
low. However, you know that the probabilities of high and low are uniform in every round.
How payoﬀs are determined
Payoﬀs in every round of this game are determined as follows.
• If you choose action , your payoﬀ for the round is 12.
• If you choose action  , your payoﬀ for the round depends on the state of the world
and the total number of players, including yourself, who choose action  .
Suppose that n =1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 represent the number of players in your group who
choose action  . If you are one of these  players, your payoﬀ for the round is given by:
Your points in one round = 12 + 2(− )
The value of c depends on the state of the world for choice Y. In every round it will be
 = 11 with probability 1
2
or  = 31 with probability 1
2
.
For example, if  = 31 and  = 1, that is, the state of world is high and you are the only
player out of the group of 7 (1/7) who chooses action  , then your payoﬀ from choosing
action  would be 12 + 2(31− 1) = 12 + 42 = 162
For another example, if  = 11 and  = 7, that is, the state of the world happens and all
five players (77) choose action  , then each player’s payoﬀ from choosing action  would
be 12 + 2(11− 7) = 12− 1180 = 02
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The complete set of possible payoﬀs you can earn from choosing action  in each round
are provided in the following table which you may refer to at any time during the experiment.
Payoﬀs in the low state of the world,  = 11
(with probability 1
2
)
Fraction of 7 players who choose action  17 27 37 47 57 67 77
Payoﬀ each earns from choosing action  122 102 82 62 42 22 02
Payoﬀs in the high state of the world,  = 31
(with probability 1
2
)
Fraction of 7 players who choose action  17 27 37 47 57 67 77
Payoﬀ each earns from choosing action  162 142 122 102 82 62 42
If you choose action , your payoﬀ for the round depends on the state of the world and
the total number of players, including yourself, who choose action .
Suppose that n =1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 represent the number of players in your group who
choose action Z. If you are one of these  players, your payoﬀ for the round is given by:
Your points in one round = 12 + 2(− )
The value of c depends on the state of the world for choice Y. In every round it will be
 = 11 or  = 31 with unknown probability, but the probability keeps uniform in every
round.
For example, if  = 31 and  = 1, that is, the state of world is high and you are the only
player out of the group of 7 (17) who chooses action , then your payoﬀ from choosing
action  would be 12 + 2(31− 1) = 12 + 42 = 162
For another example, if  = 11 and  = 7, that is, the state of the world happens and all
five players (77) choose action , then each player’s payoﬀ from choosing action  would
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be 12 + 2(11− 7) = 12− 1180 = 02
The complete set of possible payoﬀs you can earn from choosing action  in each round
are provided in the following table which you may refer to at any time during the experiment.
Payoﬀs in the low state of the world,  = 11
(with unknown probability, but uniform in every round)
Fraction of 7 players who choose action  17 27 37 47 57 67 77
Payoﬀ each earns from choosing action  122 102 82 62 42 22 02
Payoﬀs in the high state of the world,  = 31
(with unknown probability, but uniform in every round)
Fraction of 7 players who choose action  17 27 37 47 57 67 77
Payoﬀ each earns from choosing action  162 142 122 102 82 62 42
These payoﬀ possibilities from playing action , action  or action  will remain the
same over all rounds. Are there any questions about how choices determine payoﬀs?
Playing a round:
Note that in each round, when you make your decision you will not know what the other
participants in your group are doing in the round. You will also not know the state of the
world.
First, you need to make your choice on action , action  or action . The computer
will display a screen like the one shown below. Please press the button besides your choice.
You may change your choices as often as you like, but once you click on "Enter" your choice
is final.
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Meanwhile, the computer will “roll the die” to decide the state of the world of action  ,
 = 11 or  = 31, and the state of the world of action ,  = 11 or  = 31.
Then, the computer helps calculate the result, and you will be informed of your payoﬀ
in this round, your accumulated payoﬀ in the past rounds, and the decision you have made.
Payoﬀs
At the end of the experiment you will be paid, in cash, the sum of the payoﬀs that you
will have earned in the 50 rounds of the experiment plus show up fee 4 euros. The ratio
between the experimental points and euros is 1 point = 002 euros. As noted previously, you
will be paid privately and we will not disclose any information about your actions or your
payoﬀ to the other participants in the experiment.
Payoﬀ quiz
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Before we begin the experiment, please answer the following questions. The following
questions aim at helping you understand how the payoﬀs are realized. We will go through
the answers to a sample problem before you do the rest of the quiz. Please raise your hand
if you are having trouble answering one of the questions.
Sample Question: If you made a choice of action , and the state of the world  = 11
and the number of  in your group is 1 and the number of  in your group is 3, as a result,
your payoﬀ is ___6___.
Question 1: will the participants I am grouped with be the same in all rounds? _____
Question 2: Do you know the probability of high or low state of the world in action  ?
____
Question 3: Do you know the probability of high or low state of the world in action  ?
____
Question 3: If you made a choice of action , and the state of the world in action  is
 = 31 and the number of  in your group is 2, as a result, your payoﬀ is ______
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